Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral? by Paletta, Doug
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Miscellaneous Papers Miscellaneous Papers
5-2011
Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?
Doug Paletta
University of Pennsylvania, paletta@sas.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/miscellaneous_papers
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This article has been accepted for publication by Edinburgh University Press in the Journal of Scottish Philosophy, Aug 2011, vo. 9, No. 2: 149-159,
https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2011.0013
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/miscellaneous_papers/14
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Paletta, Doug, "Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?" (2011). Miscellaneous Papers. 14.
https://repository.upenn.edu/miscellaneous_papers/14
Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?
Abstract
Like all theories that account for moral motivation, Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory faces two related
challenges. The skeptical challenge calls into question what reasons an agent has to be moral at all. The priority
challenge asks why an agent's reasons to be moral tend to outweigh her non-moral reasons to act. I argue a
defender of Hutcheson can respond to these challenges by building on unique features of his account. She can
respond to skeptical challenge by drawing a direct parallel between an agent's reasons to pursue natural, self-
directed goods and her reasons to pursue moral goods. This parallel, however, makes establishing the
significance of morality difficult. Given this difficulty, a separate aspect of Hutcheson's account, the additional
weight given to benevolence in our assessment of mixed actions, can be used to respond to the priority
challenge.
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Francis Hutcheson: Why Be Moral?*1 
One of Francis Hutcheson’s chief philosophical projects centered on showing, against 
Mandeville and Hobbes, that both self love and benevolence motivate people to act. These two 
sources of motivation further map onto two ways agents approve of actions. Interestedly, agents 
approve of actions that produce pleasure or advantage. Agents also have the capacity to approve 
or disapprove of actions both distinct from “immediate pleasure” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 100) 
and independent from any advantage to the approver. Hutcheson refers to the latter as the moral 
sense and uses it to determine at the content of morality. Most commentary on Hutcheson’s 
account of moral motivation focuses on a potential conflict between moral assessment and 
motivation. In part because Hutcheson believed “neither Benevolence nor any other Affection or 
Desire can be directly raised by Volition” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 139), commenters, like John 
Bishop, Stephen Darwall and Henning Jensen, tend to focus on a traditional challenge to 
internalism (Bishop 1996; Darwall 1997; Jensen 1971). Namely, if only desires motivate and 
they are nonvolitional, how can knowing what acts are good generate a desire to motivate the 
act? 
Rather than focus on the causal and cognitive mechanisms that explain how an agent can 
act morally, I will address why, on Hutcheson’s account, she should tend to prioritise acting that 
way.2 In particular, I want to see if the account can respond to a pair of challenges facing 
accounts of moral motivation. The first challenge invokes a skeptical worry about whether we 
have any reason to be moral at all. The second focuses on the importance of morality. Can 
Hutcheson’s account explain the relative importance that moral considerations have over other 
considerations? Hutcheson’s version of moral sense theory has unique features that enable it to 
respond to each objection.3  
To show how Hutcheson can account for why we should be moral, I begin by briefly 
outlining his moral sense theory (I). With his account in hand, I turn to the pair of challenges (II). 
Hutcheson’s account can handle the skeptical challenge by drawing a parallel between the 
reasons an agent has to be moral and her reasons to act self interestedly. However, this response 
fails to explain why the pursuit of moral goods should generally have priority over the pursuit of 
self interest (III). One potential response moves Hutcheson towards his predecessor the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury by arguing that acting morally is better for you. However, the difference 
between Hutcheson and Shaftesbury’s metaphysics make this move problematic. Ultimately, I 
argue that Hutcheson can solve the problem by appealing to a feature of his account of moral 
assessment of mixed actions – the increased weight afforded to benevolence over self love (IV).  
 
I 
Hutcheson makes several claims about the moral sense that shape his account of what 
moral goodness is and how we, as humans, identify it. As mentioned above, the moral sense is 
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roughly a capacity to experience a particular type of approbation or disapprobation. Moreover, 
the moral sense is a sense and not a form of reasoning (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 100). In part 
because of this, Hutcheson states, “We are not to imagine, that this moral Sense, more than the 
other Senses, supposes any innate Ideas, Knowledge or practical Proposition” (Hutcheson [1726] 
2004: 100). The moral sense does not contain a principle of morality itself. However, principles 
may be introduced to describe this sense in the same way that scientific principles can be 
introduced to describe how we see. In both cases, the adequacy of the principles depends on what 
the respective sense apprehends. Luigi Turco sums up the nature of the moral sense by saying, “it 
is independent of our will, is common to mankind and, above all, it is immediate, that is to say, 
its deliverances are not conclusions mediated by premises” (Turco 2003: 138). 
 Having a moral sense allows humans to distinguish at least two different types of good: 
natural good and moral good. According to Hutcheson, “nothing is Advantageous or naturally 
Good to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure mediately, or immediately” (Hutcheson [1726] 
2004: 86). We determine what is naturally good by using the sense of pleasure. Natural goods are 
those things that give us pleasure. Determining what gives us pleasure in turn establishes what is 
in our interest. Due to the relationship between interest and natural goods, “natural Goods are 
pursu’d from Interest, or Self-Love” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 86). Since natural goods are 
constituted by what tends to bring an individual pleasure, an agent is motivated to obtain natural 
goods in order to benefit herself.  
Where the sense of pleasure determines natural goods, moral goods are apprehended by 
the moral sense. Hutcheson states, “the Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea 
of some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the 
Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 85). In 
order for the moral sense to provide this distinct type of approbation, Hutcheson must describe a 
quality that generates approval regardless of whether it advantages the agent. Hutcheson asserts 
that the quality is roughly ''useful[ness] to Mankind” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 98) or promoting 
the general good. Rather than self love, which seeks to advantage the agent, benevolence 
motivates moral acts by aiming to promote the general good.4 
Important for the later discussion, sometimes self love and benevolence jointly motivate 
an agent to perform an act, though the sources of motivation remain distinct (Hutcheson [1726] 
2004: 104). Insofar as self love motivates an agent, she acts to benefit herself. Insofar as 
benevolence motivates her, she acts to promote public good (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 104). This 
distinction provides the basis for the different ways someone can approve of an act. An act 
performed from benevolence elicits moral approbation. While benevolent acts are morally good, 
“we may find out some ground, even from the Views of Interest, to approve the same Actions 
which every Man admires as soon as he hears of them … [but this approval is] under a quite 
different Conception” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 94) of approval than the one arising from the 
moral sense. That is, an agent can interestedly approve of an act because it advantages her and 





motivate an agent to perform the same action, the act will only be morally praiseworthy if 
performed from benevolence. 
 So, Hutcheson provides an account that distinguishes moral goods from natural goods. A 
natural good is a private good pursued from self love. A moral good is a good pursued from 
benevolence that benefits mankind. Hutcheson clarifies what benefits mankind through a 
utilitarian principle that describes what is apprehended by the moral sense. Moreover, while self 
love and benevolence may motivate an agent to pursue the same act, only benevolent acts 
generate moral approbation.  
 
II 
 An account that explains why we should be moral ought to meet two related challenges. 
The skeptical challenge roughly proceeds as follows: an adequate moral theory should explain 
why, from her perspective, an agent should be moral. Determining that an act is good does not 
itself necessarily give an agent a reason to act. Why should she care about the demands of 
morality? The priority challenge focuses on a related topic – the importance of morality. In order 
to meet the priority challenge, a moral theory should not only be able to explain why people have 
some reason to be moral but also why moral considerations should generally have priority over 
their other considerations. The way a theory responds to the priority challenge frequently 
depends on how it answers to the skeptical challenge. 
 Mounted against Hutcheson, the skeptical challenge contends that his account does not 
explain why, from the agent’s perspective, she should act morally. Appealing to either of the two 
fundamental sources of motivation, self love and benevolence, seems problematic. Having 
argued that only benevolent actions are morally praiseworthy, the reason to perform benevolent 
actions cannot be grounded in self interest. Doing so would undermine the moral 
praiseworthiness of the acts. Prima facie, explaining the reasons an agent has to be moral in 
terms of the pleasure she receives from acting morally grounds the motivation in self interest. 
Thus, appealing to pleasure in order to explain the reasons an agent has to act benevolently 
threatens to undermine the moral praiseworthiness of those seemingly benevolent actions.  
Alternatively, Hutcheson cannot appeal to the moral sense in order to explain why 
someone should be moral. The question just is why she should follow the recommendations of 
the moral sense. These considerations help to show the nature of the challenge. The question 
'why be moral?' goes beyond whether the moral theory calls on someone to act morally. Rather, 
the skeptical challenge is concerned with whether agents have any reason to act morally in the 
first place. Moreover, the response to the challenge should not undermine the moral 
praiseworthiness of the act by reducing moral motivation to pursuing pleasure. 
 The priority challenge puts pressure on the account in a different way. Roughly, 
according to the priority challenge, an account should try to do more than establish that we have 
some reason to be moral. The account should further explain why pursuing moral goods tends to 
have priority over pursuing natural goods. This challenge still focuses on the reasons an agent 





what reasons an agent has to be moral at all, the priority challenge calls for an explanation that 
accounts for why an agent’s reasons to be moral tend to outweigh her nonmoral reasons to act.  
Moral sense theorists may reject the need to address the priority challenge. After all, if 
our experience with morality comes from sense and sentiments, the question of priority appears 
to be largely empirical. So long as most people act morally most of the time, what more can be 
said to respond to the priority challenge. At a minimum, however, a moral sense theory that 
responds to the challenge by providing a more principled answer is prima facie better than one 
that does not. Hutcheson’s moral sense theory can respond to these challenges.  
 
III 
 Hutcheson does not provide an explicit answer to either challenge. In the section of his 
Inquiry titled “Concerning the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions,” Hutcheson is more 
concerned with showing that benevolent acts are possible than explaining why someone should 
act out of benevolence. Hutcheson argues that we can act benevolently and that we sometimes do 
act benevolently (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 112-115). However, since neither of the challenges 
questions whether we can act benevolently, a defender of Hutcheson will have to build on his 
account to respond to these challenges. The skeptical challenge, when applied to the question of 
why we should be moral, does not challenge morality itself. Rather, the question puts pressure on 
why we should act as morality dictates. That is, the challenge grants Hutcheson’s account of 
moral goodness as well as the claim that we can be moved by benevolence and self love. 
Drawing a parallel between the reason an agent has to act morally and the reason an agent has to 
act self interestedly responds to the skeptical challenge. 
What reason does someone have to pursue natural goods? The reason an agent has to 
pursue natural goods depends on the relationship between the goods and the agent. When an 
agent pursues a natural good, she pursues that which tends to generate some private pleasure. 
The reason to pursue private pleasure is grounded in love or esteem for oneself. That is, the 
reason someone should pursue her own pleasure is that she loves herself. Moreover, each person 
does love herself. Hence, each person has reason, from her own perspective, to pursue natural 
goods. This point is further corroborated in Hutcheson’s account by the relationship between 
pleasure and interest. Since that which is apt to bring about pleasure defines what is in our 
interest, when someone acts to promote her pleasure she also acts in her own interest. Self love 
provides a reason for each person to pursue natural goods. Each agent loves herself, and pursuing 
natural goods is the best way for her to get that which tends to bring her pleasure. 
A defender of Hutcheson can explain the reason each person to act morally, from her 
perspective, by following a similar line of reasoning. What reason does someone have to pursue 
moral goods? Pursuing moral goods involves pursuing that which tends to promote the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number. The reason to promote the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number is grounded in love or esteem for others. Moreover, agents love others (Hutcheson 
[1726] 2004: 102). Hence, each agent has a reason, from her own perspective, to act morally. 





Meeting the skeptical challenge by appealing to agent's love of others is a good way to 
respond to the challenge for at least three reasons. First, as presented, the skeptical challenge 
attacks Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation, not his account of human nature. This line of  
response to the challenge against Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation builds on the 
importance of his section about how human motivation works. By defending the claim that we 
do act benevolently, Hutcheson defends the empirical claim needed to explain why someone 
should act morally. Second, grounding an agent’s reasons to act morally in the agent's love of 
others does not reduce the reason an agent should act morally to the pursuit of pleasure. By 
avoiding this reduction, the response preserves the moral praiseworthiness of actions performed 
on this basis. Finally, the reason to pursue moral goods has a structure paralleling that of the 
reason to pursue natural goods. If love of others is not an adequate basis for explaining why 
someone should pursue moral goods, then self love will not be an adequate basis for explaining 
why she should pursue natural goods.  
While the symmetry between self love and benevolence allows Hutcheson's account to 
respond to the skeptical challenge, it plays into the worry presented by the priority challenge. 
Among the strengths of the response to the skeptical challenge is the direct parallel between the 
reasons to act morally and the reasons to pursue natural goods. Given this parallel, however, the 
reasons to act morally are put on the same footing with the reasons to act for self interest. Since 
they are on the same footing, the reason to be moral does not appear to have priority over the 
reason to pursue self interest. At least three ways of modifying Hutcheson’s account to address 
the priority challenge encounter problems. First, moving towards Shaftesbury, Hutcheson could 
appeal to a metaphysical difference between moral goods and natural goods. Second, Hutcheson 
could follow Shaftesbury by claiming that agents should act benevolently because doing so is 
most apt to bring them happiness. Finally, Hutcheson could make an empirical claim about the 
sources of motivation that love of others almost always is stronger than self love. Briefly 
addressing each sets standards for a successful response. 
 Though Hutcheson famously follows Shaftesbury with his moral sense theory, he 
approaches the moral sense in a very different way. Again, for Hutcheson the moral sense is a 
sense, and we discover moral principles in the same way we discover optical principles, by 
looking to experience. Shaftesbury does not have such an empirical approach. Shaftesbury 
allows that actions motivated by self love may be virtuous so long as that action promotes the 
“general system” (Shaftesbury [1711] 1999: 169) created by God. These actions may still be 
virtuous because in promoting God’s general system they promote an independently good moral 
order. Each person has a reason to be good and to prioritise good actions because doing so 
promotes God’s general system. That is, good actions are different in kind than not good actions, 
and this difference, that they promote God’s general system, potentially responds to the priority 
challenge. Since Hutcheson, instead, approaches the moral sense the same way someone might 
approach optics, he cannot avail himself of such a response. While pursuing moral goods elicits a 





metaphysically better. That would be like calling taste better than smell. Without some further 
story or goal, scent is not better or worse than taste.  
Moving towards Shaftesbury in another way could create a second problem. In order to 
explain why we should promote the general system, Shaftesbury argues for “an obligation to 
virtue consisting in the fact that the virtuous life realised the agent’s good” (Darwall 1995: 208). 
Hutcheson praises the project of showing the convergence of morality and interest and 
sometimes presents a similar argument. He partly accounts for the importance of the moral sense 
by contending “that [the moral sense] gives us more Pleasure and Pain than all our other 
Facultys” (Hutcheson [1726] 2004: 162). However, this affinity between Hutcheson and 
Shaftesbury cannot solve the problem. Noting a difference between Hutcheson and Shaftesbury, 
Grote states: 
 
Unlike Shaftesbury, Hutcheson refuses to admit any fundamental distinction 
between affections toward private interest and affections towards which we are 
led by a desire for the pleasures of virtue itself. In so far as both types have as 
their end the attainment of pleasure, however sublime, Hutcheson considers them 
both self interested (Grote 2006: 167). 
 
Acting morally in order to realise an agent’s good or experience virtuous pleasure reduces moral 
motivation to interested motivation. Modifying his account in this way would undermine a 
special feature of Hutcheson’s account – the independence of benevolence – and potentially 
undermine the praiseworthiness of benevolent actions. Hutcheson cannot solve the priority 
problem by arguing that we should be benevolent in order to be happy.  
Finally, the account may rely on an empirical response to the priority challenge. Perhaps 
most agents’ love of others is stronger than their self love. If an agent’s love of others is greater 
than her self love, then she seems to have a strong reason, as well as motivation, to act morally 
rather than self interestedly. That is, her pursuit of moral goods should tend to take priority over 
her pursuit of natural goods since her love of others is stronger than her self love. Unlike the 
second move, this response does not explain the priority of the pursuit of morality by appealing 
to the amount of pleasure procured by pursuing moral goods.  
The empirical response to the priority challenge faces two related problems. First, 
according to the response, the priority of the pursuit of morality is contingent on the relative 
strength of the two types of love in each agent. As such, the response does not provide an in 
principle basis for establishing the priority of morality. Second, the claim that most agents have 
stronger love for others than for themselves is not obvious. As Turco bluntly puts it: 
“benevolence . . . is weaker than self-love” (Turco 2003: 137). If the only way to establish the 
priority of the pursuit of morality depends on the relative strength of the two types of love, then 
the defender of Hutcheson has a difficult case to make. Both of these problems point to the fact 





findings may support the claim that an agent’s love of others outweighs her self love, the 
findings may turn out to support the opposite claim.  
Though putting benevolence on the same footing as a fundamental motivating desire 
provides a ready answer to the skeptical challenge, doing so opens Hutcheson’s account to the 
priority challenge. By basing his account of moral goodness on the moral sense alone, Hutcheson 
cannot respond to the priority challenge by appealing to a metaphysical difference between the 
importance of moral and natural goods or to the pleasure produced by securing each. Moreover, 
an empirical response provides only a weak response to the challenge. The response does not 
establish that moral considerations should tend to trump nonmoral ones. Instead, it argues that 
moral considerations are not precluded from doing so. Again, a defender of Hutcheson can 
consistently respond to the skeptical challenge while leaving the priority challenge up to the 
empirical question. All things equal, however, an account that provides some sort of response 
beyond this empirical one will be on better footing to respond to the challenges. 
 
IV 
 The neat symmetry between natural and moral goods, as well as the motivational basis 
for each, precludes a response to the priority challenge that contrasts the two sides against one 
another. Rather than compare actions motivated purely by self love against actions motivated 
purely by benevolence, I propose the solution to the priority problem lies in examining actions 
motivated by both, Hutcheson’s so called mixed actions. Again, mixed actions are those jointly 
motivated by Hutcheson’s two fundamental sources of motivation: self love and benevolence. 
The structural similarity behind the motivation and assessment of pure actions breaks down in 
mixed cases. As Darwall leaves the problem at the end of his article “Hutcheson and Practical 
Reason,” when “the agent prudentially ought to do A and morally ought to do B . . . [s]hould she 
do what she prudentially ought? Or should she do what she morally ought?” (Darwall 1997: 87). 
While looking at mixed actions does not permanently settle this question, doing so gives some 
reason to prioritise acting morally. 
Granting Hutcheson’s two sources of motivation, mixed actions seem to be a particularly 
prevalent category of action. Most social interactions, like teaching, are unlikely to be motivated 
purely by self love or benevolence. Rather, deciding to teach (and what to teach) is partly driven 
to secure natural goods for myself, like esteem, and partly driven by an effort to teach important 
things to students while developing their critical skills. Most decisions in social circumstances 
include these two types of considerations. As part of a social group, what will I get out of the 
decision? But also, as part of this social group, what decision will be best for the group as a 
whole? If most social interactions have this dual structure with both self regarding and other 
regarding motivation, then we have a particularly strong reason to pay attention to mixed actions. 
In the Inquiry, Hutcheson describes how we assess mixed actions. He states:  
 
if a Man have such strong Benevolence, as would have produc’d an Action 





Advantage, along with publick Good, as the Effect of his Action, does no way 
diminish the Benevolence of the Action. When he would not have produc’d so 
much publick Good, had it not been for Prospect of Self interest, then the Effect 
of Self love is to be deducted, and his Benevolence is proportion’d to the 
remainder of Good, which pure Benevolence would have produc’d (Hutcheson 
[1726] 2004: 104). 
 
Put differently, when assessing mixed actions, the degree to which benevolence motivates the 
action, even when self interest is also necessary, is given full measure. So, if a jointly excited act 
could have been excited by either benevolence or self love, but in fact is excited by both, we 
assess the act as benevolent. 
 Taken together, we have some reason to think mixed actions are prevalent, particularly in 
our social interaction. Moreover, while the sources of motivation for these types of actions have 
a similar structure, the approval elicited falls squarely on the side of moral approbation. Unlike 
pure cases, where interest approves of self loving acts similarly to how the moral sense approves 
of benevolent acts, in mixed cases benevolence has more weight than self love. All things equal, 
the asymmetry in the approval of mixed actions provides some reason to give considerations of 
benevolence more weight than considerations of self love because the moral sense approves of 
these actions more strongly than interest. While this does not guarantee that benevolence will 
trump self love, it can explain why, all things equal, considerations of benevolence should be 
more pressing than considerations of self love.  
Establishing priority by appealing the asymmetry in the assessment of actions has three 
significant advantages. Doing so locates the basis of priority in the agent, does not reduce moral 
motivation to interested motivation, and provides an in principle basis for prioritizing 
benevolence. Avoiding the first problem with a potential move towards Shaftesbury, this 
response to the priority challenge does not invoke an external account of goodness. Rather than 
refer to good states of affairs, a Hutchesonian can overcome the priority challenge by examining 
motivation and assessment. Avoiding the second problem with a potential move towards 
Shaftesbury, relying on the asymmetry in assessment does not reduce the motivation to be moral 
to self love, maintaining a key distinguishing feature of Hutcheson’s account. Finally, the 
proposed basis of priority is structural. Regardless of the particulars of Hutcheson’s account of 
moral psychology or the empirical make up of any individual, Hutcheson’s moral sense theory 
can provide an all things equal presumption in favor of acting morally from the relationships 
between benevolence, self love, pleasure and moral assessment. 
Like all moral theories, Hutcheson’s moral sense theory faces two related challenges. It 
must both be able to explain what reasons an agent has to be moral and to do so in a way that 
accounts for the importance or priority of morality. Hutcheson can explain the reason an agent 
has to act morally by appealing to one of the two fundamental sources of motivation: 
benevolence. An agent’s reason to act morally parallels her reason to pursue natural goods. 





addressing the priority challenge difficult. Fortunately, the assessment of mixed actions includes 
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1 Earlier versions of this text were presented at the Spring Ethics Conference in March 2007 at 
Felician College, with comments by David Morrow, and the 4th International Reid Symposium in 
September 2007 at Princeton Theological Seminary.  
2 In this paper I use reason in a colloquial sense. I am not referring to Reason as a cognitive 
faculty or Hutcheson’s two technical uses of the term, exciting reason and justifying reason. 
Roughly, exciting reasons are the desires that motivate an act where justifying reasons explain 
why an act engenders moral approbation. Justifying reasons cannot elicit action and exciting 
reasons identify the particular motivations of an actor. When I use the term ‘reason,’ I instead 
mean more generally the considerations that are relevant for an agent to take into account given 
her sources of motivation. These considerations are broader than Hutcheson’s exciting reasons 
because he restricts them to natural goods and self love. Additionally, my sense of reason is 






exciting and justifying reasons see: Darwall “Hutcheson on Practical Reason and chapter five of 
Strasser’s Francis Hutcheson’s Moral Theory Its Form and Utility. 
3 For a contemporary example of these standards see chapter 4 of Scanlon’s What we Owe to 
Each Other.  
4 For more on the distinction between natural and moral goods see pages 211-216 of Darwall’s 
The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’.  
